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drick Hudson Central Board of Education v. Rowley, 102 S. Ct.
3034 (1982).
Before Amy Rowley, a deaf child,' entered kindergarten at Furnace Woods School in Hendrick Hudson Central School District,
Peekskill, New York, her parents2 met with school administrators to
explore options regarding Amy's education. 3 At that time, the parties
agreed that Amy would attend kindergarten at the Furnace Woods
School in a regular 4 classroom for the purpose of identifying supplemental services which might be required to educate her. 5 Several
school administrators attended sign language interpretation courses in
preparation for Amy's enrollment and the school installed a teletype

7
phone machine (TTY) 6 for use in communicating with the Rowleys.

I Amy is prelingually deaf (deaf before the age of two years) but she has residual hearing
which means that she can identify sounds below the frequencies of human speech, e.g., a dog
barking or a car backfiring. On the basis of extensive evidentiary proceedings, the District Court
for the Southern District of New York found that Amy's residual hearing lent considerable aid to
her lipreading skills despite respondent's claim that she was unable to distinguish those sounds.
Rowley v. Hendrick Hudson Cent. Bd. of Educ. I, 483 F. Supp. 528, 529 (S.D.N.Y.), a.fJ'd per
curiam, 632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 1034 (1982). Although the
parties disagreed about Amy's residual hearing capabilities, this point was not directly argued
before the Supreme Court. Therefore, for the purposes of this Note, the district court's findings
of fact will be accepted as conclusive.
2 Both of Amy's parents are deaf and college educated. Clifford Rowley is a research
chemist. Nancy Rowley has a master's degree in special education and is a certified teacher of the
deaf. Brief for Respondents at 1, Hendrick Hudson Central Board of Education v. Rowley, 102
S. Ct. 3034 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Respondent].
Hendrick Hudson Cent. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 102 S. Ct. 3034, 3039 (1982).
The term "'regular" is a term of art used in the education field to distinguish between
classrooms that are used exclusively for the education of handicapped children (special classes)
and those classrooms not used to instruct the handicapped (regular class). Amy's placement in a
regular classroom is representative of the "mainstreaming" philosophy in the special education
field. For a discussion of the issues and problems of mainstreaming, see J. PAUL, A. TURNBULL &
W. CRUICKSHANK, MAINSTREAMING: A PrAcriCAL GUIDE (1977).
Hendrick Hudson Cent. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 102 S. Ct. 3034, 3039 (1982).
The teletype phone machine (TTY) is similar to a telegraph machine. When connected
with the telephone circuits, this device functions like a typewriter and allows a deaf individual to
communicate over the phone through typing or receiving a printed message. Both parties must
have a TTY. Interview with Diana Strauss, M.A.C.C.C.-A., Supervisor of Audiology, Mt.
Carmel Guild, Newark, New Jersey (November 18, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Interview with
Diana Strauss].
I Hendrick Hudson Cent. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 102 S. Ct. 3034, 3039 (1982).
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The evaluation commenced with a trial period during which Amy was
without supportive services." At the conclusion of this phase, the
school administrators decided to provide her with an F.M. wireless
hearing aid.9 In the course of the evaluation period, the school also
provided the services of a sign language interpreter on a two week
trial basis. 10 The interpreter reported that Amy did not require his
services at the time.11
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 197512
(EAHCA) requires that an individual education program (IEP)13 be

I Rowley v. Hendrick Hudson Cent. Bd. of Educ. I, 483 F. Supp. 528, 530 (S.D.N.Y.),
alf'd per curiam, 632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982).
9 Hendrick Hudson Cent. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 102 S. Ct. 3034, 3039 (1982). The F.M.
wireless is a hearing amplification device that operates on the same principle as a car radio.
Sound is transmitted and amplified through a transmitting device into a receiver. Interview with
Diana Strauss, supra note 6. The receiver is attached to the hearing aid of the individual
recipient.. Id. Generally, individual hearing aids are superior to the F.M. wireless in sound
amplification and reproduction. Id. The F.M. wireless, however, does amplify sound from one
source directly to the individual. Id. In Amy's classroom, the amplification device was passed
around the room to the main speaker. Brief for Petitioner at 7, Hendrick Hudson Central Board
of Education v. Rowley, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982).
10 Rowley v. Hendrick Hudson Cent. Bd. of Educ. I, 483 F. Supp. 528, 530 (S.D.N.Y.), aJf'd
per curiam, 632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982).
11 Id. The interpreter reported that his services were unnecessary because of the teacher's
depth of sensitivity towards Amy's deafness and Amy's own resistance to follow his signing. Id.
11 Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (amending Education of the Handicapped Act, Pub. L.
No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 175 (1970), amended by Education of the Handicapped Amendments of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, §§ 611-621, 88 Stat. 484, 579-85)) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1420
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The Acts are intended
to assure that all handicapped children have available to them . . . a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs, to assure that the rights of handicapped children
and their parents or guardians are protected, to assist States and localities to provide
for the education of all handicapped children, and to assess and assure the effectiveness of efforts to educate handicapped children.
20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (Supp. IV 1980) (emphasis added).
Under the EAHCA, handicapped children
means mentally retarded, hard of hearing, deaf, speech impaired, visually handicapped, seriously emotionally disturbed, orthopedically impaired, or other health
impaired children, or children with specific learning disabilities, who by reason
thereof require special education and related services.
Id. § 1401(1) (1976).
"
The IEP is defined as:
a written statement for each handicapped child developed in any meeting by a
representative of the local educational agency. . . who shall be qualified to provide,
or supervise the provision of, specially designed instruction to meet the unique needs
of handicapped children, the teacher, the parents or guardian of such child . . .
which statement shall include (A) a statement of the present levels of educational
performance of such child, (B) a statement of annual goals, including short-term
instructional objectives, (C) a statement of the specific educational services to be
provided to such child, and the extent to which such child will be able to participate
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established annually for every handicapped child.' 4 In order to comply with this requirement, the school administrators began preparing
Amy's first grade IEP'5 in the fall following her completion of kindergarten.'H The school first obtained a recommendation from the district
Committee on the Handicapped (Committee).' 7 The Committee received testimony from individuals familiar with Amy's educational
experience.' 8 This testimony included evidence regarding the importance of interpretive services.' 9 The Committee recommended continued use of the F.M. wireless, provision of specialized tutorial services
for one hour daily, and speech therapy for three one-hour sessions
weekly. 20 The Committee also determined that an interpreter's services were not required, despite the Rowley's request that the IEP

in regular educational programs, (D) the projected date for initiation and anticipated duration of such services, and (E) appropriate objective criteria and evaluation procedures and schedules for determining, on at least an annual basis, whether
instructional objectives are being achieved.
Id. § 1401(19) (emphasis added).
14 Id. § 1414(a)(5).
's The school administration formulated an IEP for Amy's kindergarten year with which the
Rowleys fully concurred. Rowley v. Hendrick Hudson Cent. Bd. of Educ. I, 483 F. Supp. 528,
530 n.2 (S.D.N.Y.), a'ffd per curiam, 632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980), revd and remanded, 102 S.
Ct. 3034 (1982).
06 Id.
17 Id.
,s Id. at 530-31.
,o Id. The Rowleys use a method of communication known as "total communication" (TC).
Id. at 530. There are four basic communication philosophies pertaining to education of the deaf:
manual communication, oral and aural instruction, cued speech, and total communication.
Large, Special Problems of the Deaf Under the Education ForAll Handicapped Children Act of
1975, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 213, 229 (1980).
Manual communication, or sign language, is probably the method most lay persons associate with communication for the deaf. Utilizing hand signals for entire concepts and for individual letters, this method does not rely on oral speech. Id. at 229. Oral instruction involves the total
absence of manual signing, while emphasizing the use of residual hearing and lipreading. Id. at
232-33. Cued speech is a manual modification of the oral method involving the use of first letter
signs with voiced speech to alleviate the difficulties encountered in lipreading (many sounds look
similar on the lips). Id. at 237.
Total communication is a combination of all communication philosophies and can be
compared with a multilingual approach to speech. Id. at 236. It strives to expose an individual to
all forms of communication with the individual eventually selecting the method most appropriate for his environment. Id. at 235-36. Since the Rowleys had employed TC successfully with
Amy in social, as well as other learning environments, they believed continuation of TC in the
classroom would be the best approach to educating Amy in a regular classroom. Rowley v.
Hendrick Hudson Cent. Bd. of Educ. I, 483 F. Supp. 528, 530 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 632
F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982).
20 Rowley v. Hendrick Hudson Cent. Bd. of Educ. I, 483 F. Supp. 528, 531 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd
per curiam, 632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982).
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include this service. 2 1 The school administration followed the recommendations of the Committee.
Pursuant to specific procedural guarantees established by the
EAHCA, 23 the Rowleys challenged the school's refusal to include
interpretive services in Amy's IEP. 24 Accordingly, they received a
hearing before an independent examiner who decided against the
Rowley's position on the basis of Amy's academic achievement and
social interaction. 25 The Rowleys appealed the examiner's decision to
the New York Commissioner of Education who affirmed the decision
on the basis of substantial evidence from the record below.26 The
Rowleys then sued the Board of Education and the New York Commissioner of Education in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, 27 alleging that the refusal to provide

21
22
23

Id.
Id.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(E), (b)(2) (1976).

24 Rowley v. Hendrick Hudson Cent. Bd. of Educ. I, 483 F. Supp. 528,531 (S.D.N.Y.), aJj'd
per curiam, 632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982).
25 Id. Judge Broderick of the district court also found that Amy was bright,
eager, well
adjusted, and cooperative with her peers. Id. Moreover, he concluded that she responded
accurately to instructions and even helped classmates with assignments. Id.
Id. This appeal was taken pursuant to New York law. As specified in 20 U.S.C. §
1415(b)(1) (1976), the administrative remedies are not limited to the single review procedure.
New York has expanded its procedure to include appeals from the hearing officer to the State
Commissioner of Education. The Commissioner is to conduct an impartial review and render an
independent decision. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4404(2), (3) (McKinney 1981). But see Monahan v.
Nebraska I, 645 F.2d 592 (8th Cir. 1981) (review by State Commissioner of Education may
constitute conflict with federal statute).
27 The Rowleys exhausted their administrative remedies with respect
to the 1978-1979 IEP.
Rowley v. Hendrick Hudson Cent. Bd. of Educ. II, 483 F. Supp. 536, 537 (S.D.N.Y.), aJf'd per
curiam, 632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982). Prior to trial,
however, the 1979-1980 school year began and a new IEP was developed. Id. at 537-38. The
Education Commissioner challenged the jurisdiction of the court, maintaining that the Rowleys
had not exhausted their administrative remedies for the 1979-1980 IEP. Id. at 538. Since the
1979-1980 IEP rendered the 1978-1979 IEP ineffective, the Commissioner alleged that while the
court had jurisdiction to review the 1978-1979 IEP, that IEP was now moot. Id.
Judge Broderick held that the substantial time lapse between the formulation of the IEP and
the end of the school year, and between then and the trial, could continually render the IEP
moot. Id. Therefore, he invoked the exception to the mootness doctrine. Id. (citing Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976)) (conduct "capable of repetition yet evading review"
creates exception to mootness doctrine). The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
has been heavily litigated under the EAHCA. E.g., McGovern v. Sullins, 676 F.2d 98 (4th Cir.
1982) (plaintiffs suit dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies when no formal
complaint filed against local education agency); Monahan v. Nebraska I, 645 F.2d 592 (8th Cir.
1981) (exhaustion not required when futile or administrative remedy inadequate); Scruggs v.
Campbell, 630 F.2d 237 (4th Cir. 1980) (federal action premature when plaintiff filed prior to
final administrative disposition).
26
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interpretive services in Amy's 1978-1979 IEP violated the EAHCA's
' 28
guarantee of a "free appropriate public education. "
After an extensive hearing, Judge Broderick of the district court
granted preliminary injunctive relief by providing Amy with a sign
language interpreter.29 Although Judge Broderick found that Amy
was receiving an " 'adequate' education, ' 30 he held that this was not
the proper test to determine compliance with the EAHCA. 31 Rather,
he found that the operative standard of an appropriate education was
the opportunity for a handicapped child "to achieve his full potential
' 32
commensurate with the opportunity provided to other children. "
Given Amy's ability to comprehend only fifty-nine percent of the
words spoken to her, i.e., her speech discrimination level, 33 Judge
Broderick determined that "she [was] not learning as much, or per34
forming as well academically, as she would without her handicap."
Thus, the school was not providing Amy with the same level of
educational opportunity afforded to the nonhandicapped children.
According to the district court's standard, Amy's education could not
equal her classmates' unless she were provided the opportunity to have
a one hundred percent speech discrimination level. 35 Therefore, the
school had denied Amy a free appropriate education as guaranteed
36
under the EAHCA.

28 Hendrick Hudson Cent. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 102 S. Ct. 3034, 3040 (1982).
29 Rowley v. Hendrick Hudson Cent. Bd. of Educ. I, 483 F. Supp. 528, 529 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd
per curiam, 632 F.2d 945 (2d Gir. 1980), rev'd and remanded, 102 S.Ct. 3034 (1982).
Judge Broderick also rejected the Commissioner's claim that 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1976)
limited the court's scope of review to the issue of a state's procedural compliance. See Rowley I,
483 F. Supp. at 533. Rather, he viewed the EAHCA more expansively and found that the Act
"left entirely to the courts and the hearing officers" the task of "giv[ing] content to the requirement of an 'appropriate education.' " Id.
30 Rowley v. Hendrick Hudson Cent. Bd. of Educ. I, 483 F. Supp. 528, 534 (S.D.N.Y.), afJ'd
per curiam, 632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd and remanded, 102 S.Ct. 3034 (1982). Judge
Broderick determined the adequacy of Amy's education by evaluating her performance in the
classroom. Because her performance was above average and she advanced from grade to grade,
he concluded that the school was providing Amy with an adequate program. Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 532. Speech discrimination ability was measured by the Goldman-Fristoe-Woodcock Test of Auditory Discrimination. This test evaluates "speech sound discrimination ability
while minimizing the influence of variables such as abstractness or familiarity with the vocabulary and illustrations used." Goldman, Fristoe & Woodcock, A New Dimension in the Assessment of Speech Sound Discrimination,4 J. OF LFASRNING DISAHILMTES 364, 364 (1971).
34 Rowley v. Hendrick Hudson Cent. Bd.of Educ. I, 483 F. Supp. 528, 532 (S.D.N.Y.), aJJ'd
per curiam, 632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982).
31 Id. The district court stated that "[w]ith the use of 'total communication' [Amy] can
identify 100% of the words spoken to her." Id.
36 Id. at 534.
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The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower
court's decision. 37 After stating that section 1415(e)(2) of the Act
required the reviewing court to base its decision "on the preponderance of the evidence," 38 the court held that the decision below 39 met
this standard, 40 but then limited its holding to the "unique" facts of
41
the case.
In Hendrick Hudson Central Board of Education v. Rowley,4 2
the United States Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision and denied Amy the services of a sign language interpreter. 43 In so
doing the Court held that the "basic floor of opportunity" intended
under the EAHCA was a program of specialized instruction combined
with related services;44 the program must be individually designed to
enable the student to benefit educationally. 45 Moreover, it must be
provided by the state at public expense. 46 Thus, an appropriate education is provided when a program includes personalized educational
services .47
Further, the majority stated that the program "must meet the
State's educational standards, must approximate the grade levels used
in the State's regular education, and must comport with the child's
IEP. ' ' 48 Finally, the Court opined that the program was to comply

" Rowley v. Hendrick Hudson Cent. Bd. of Educ., 632 F.2d 945, 947 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd
and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982).
38 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1976) provides in pertinent part that "[i]n any action brought
under this paragraph the court shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings, shall
hear additional evidence at the request of a party, and, basing its decision on the preponderance
of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate." As the court of
appeals noted, this standard differed from the one which the EAHCA originally contained.
Initially, the House of Representatives proposed that the standard of proof be one of "substantial
evidence." Rowley v. Hendrick Hudson Cent. Bd. of Educ., 632 F.2d 945, 948 n.5 (2d Cir.
1980), rev'd and remanded, 102 S.Ct. 3034 (1982); see also H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 56 (1975) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 332].
" See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
'0 Rowley v. Hendrick Hudson Cent. Bd. of Educ., 632 F.2d 945, 948 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd
and remanded, 102 S.Ct. 3034 (1982).
41 Id. In fact, the court invoked a Second Circuit rule which precluded
courts from citing the
decision as authority in any subsequent case. Id. at 948 n.7.
42 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982).
43 Id. at 3052-53.
44 Id. at 3048. See infra notes 70 & 71.
45 102 S. Ct. at 3049.
48 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. The requirements that the program "meet the State's educational standards" and that
it "comport with the child's IEP" are found in the Act itself. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(18), 1412(6)
(1976). The requirement that the program "approximate the grade levels in the State's regular
education" system was not further explained by the Court, nor are the words drawn from the Act
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with the requirements of the EAHCA, and be "reasonably calculated"
to allow the child to achieve passing grades and advance from grade to
grade. 49 In evaluating whether an IEP met this standard, a reviewing
court would be limited to a determination of whether the state had
complied with the EAHCA procedures and whether the IEP was
50
reasonably calculated to benefit the child educationally.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, began the Court's
opinion with an overview of the legislative schemes preceding the
enactment of the EAHCA. In 1966, Congress first attempted to organize federal efforts to aid handicapped children by amending Title
VI 51 of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.52 These
amendments authorized appropriations "in the form of a grant program 53 'for the purpose of assisting the States in the initiation, expansion and improvement of programs and projects. . . for the education

or the federal regulations. Since the word approximate means to "come near or nearly resemble,"
WEBSTER's NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 107 (3d ed. 1979), it is reasonable to conclude that
the Court intended that the education program have a graduated structure which allows the
measurement of a handicapped child's intellectual advancement to reasonably correspond to a
nonhandicapped child's advancement.
41 102 S. Ct. at 3042, 3049; see Kruelle v. New Castle County School Dist., 642 F.2d 687 (3d
Cir. 1981) (no substantive mandate to states in EAHCA regarding content of IEP); cf. Battle v.
Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1980) (congressional intent that establishment of specific
educational goals and methods strictly province of states), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 968 (1981). But
see Springdale School Dist. v. Grace, 656 F.2d 300 (8th Cir. 1981) (state to give each handicapped child opportunity to achieve full potential commensurate with opportunity provided
other children), vacated and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 3054 (1982).
o 102 S. Ct. at 3051. But see Anderson v. Thompson, 658 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1981) (court
has power to devise any program to ensure appropriate individualized education program).
" See Act of Nov. 3, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-750, 80 Stat. 1204 (repealed 1970).
51 102 S. Ct. at 3037; see Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 8910, 79 Stat. 27. Although the legislative history of the 1966 amendment sheds no light on
congressional motivation, a 1970 Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare characterized
the 1966 legislation "as a major step in making special education services available to handicapped children in elementary and secondary schools." S. REP. No. 634, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1,
90, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & Au. NEws 2768, 2832 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No.
634]. The Committee further stated that the 1966 amendment was a response to a recognition
that existing programs were administratively fragmented and ineffective. Id. The amendment
was directed at alleviating these problems by:
1) assist[ing] the States [in] initiating, expanding, and improving education programs designed to serve handicapped children,
2) creat[ing] a Bureau of Education for the Handicapped to administer special
programs for handicapped children, and
3) establish[ing] a National Advisory Council on Handicapped Children to advise
the Commissioner, the Secretary, and the Congress on the educational needs of the
handicapped.
Id.
'3 102 S. Ct. at 3037.
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of handicapped children.' ,,s4 In 1970, Congress enacted the Education of the Handicapped Act 55 which repealed the 1966 Act, but left
the grant structure of the Title VI legislation intact. 5 As Justice
Rehnquist noted, however, neither of these legislative schemes had set
forth specific guidelines as to the manner in which states were to
utilize the grant funds. 57 Following two district court decisions holding that "handicapped children should be given access to a public
education, '",' Congress passed the Education of the Handicapped
Amendments of 1974 59 which amended the Education of the Handicapped Act. 60 These amendments provided for additional funding, 1
and additional state plan requirements, 6 2 one of which was that states
establish "a goal of providing full educational opportunities to all
handicapped children. '6 3 As the 1974 amendments were only interim

54 Id. (quoting Act of Nov. 3, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-750, § 601(a), 80 Stat. 1191, 1204
(repealed 1970)).
" Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 175 (1970) (amended 1974, 1975).
51 102 S.Ct. at 3037; see also S. REP. No. 634, supra note 52, at 92, reprinted in 1970 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at-2834.
57

102 S.Ct. at 3037.

" Id.; see Mills v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972);
Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971),
modified, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (consent agreement modified upon rehearing)
[hereinafter PARC]. Mills and PARC are watershed cases because they established that handicapped children have a right of access to a state's public school system. See 102 S. Ct. at 3044.
Both Mills and PARC were resolved by consent decrees. 348 F. Supp. at 871; 343 F. Supp.
at 285. The decree in PARC enjoined application of the state statute and required the defendants
"to provide ... access to a free public program of education and training appropriate to [the
child's] learning capacities." 343 F. Supp. at 302. The Mills court identified the state's interest in
educating handicapped children as paramount and directed the state to provide all children with
a publicly supported education consistent with a child's "needs and ability to benefit therefrom."
348 F. Supp. at 876. See generally Haggerty & Sacks, Education Of The Handicapped:Towards
A Definition Of An Appropriate Education, 50 TEMP. L. Q. 961 (1977).
" Pub. L. No. 93-380, §§ 611-621, 88 Stat. 484, 579-85 (amended 1975).
10 See 102 S. Ct. at 3037 n.2.
61 Education of the Handicapped Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 611, 88 Stat.
484, 580-81.
62 Id. § 612, at 581-82.
63 Id. § 612, at 582. As Justice Rehnquist noted, this was the first time such a requirement
was imposed on participating states. 102 S.Ct. at 3037.
64 102 S. Ct. at 3037 (citing H.R. REP. No. 332, supra note 38, at 4). Despite the interim
nature of the 1974 amendments, the legislation set forth extensive due process procedures to be
followed by participating states and required that states submit detailed plans for identifying,
locating, and evaluating handicapped children within the state. S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1, 7, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1425, 1431 [hereinafter cited as S.
REP. No. 168]. See generally Comment, The Education Of All Handicapped Children Act Of
1975, 10 MicH. J.L. REFORM 110, 116, 120 (1976).
65 S. REP. No. 168, supra note 64, at 7, reprinted in1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
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measures,6 4 Congress continued to study the problem of publicly edu66
cating the handicapped,6 5 and finally enacted the EAHCA.
The Court began its construction of the EAHCA by rejecting the
lower court's finding that free appropriate public education was not
defined in the Act. 7 The majority stated: "It is beyond dispute that
contrary to the conclusions of the courts below, the Act does expressly
define 'free appropriate public education.' "68 To support this statement, the majority pointed to the section of the EAHCA which states
that a " 'free appropriate public education' means special education
and related services."6' The Court then combined the statutory definitions of special education7 0 and related services 7' and concluded that a
" 'free appropriate education' consisted of educational instruction specially designed to meet the unique needs of the handicapped child,
supported by such services as are necessary to permit the child 'to
' 72
benefit' from the instruction. "
In determining who was entitled to a free appropriate education,
the Court noted the relevance of several congressional findings included in the EAHCA. 1) There were approximately eight million
handicapped children in the United States; 73 2) one million of these

e Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975).
17 102 S. Ct. at 3041.
6" Id. The Court determined that although the term "appropriate" did not express any
precise standard, Congress' use of the word established definite settings and services which are
essential for an education to be appropriate. Id. at 3046 n.21. Thus, concluded the Court,
Congress' use of appropriate "seem[ed] to reflect . .. [a] recognition that some settings simply
are not suitable environments for the participation of some handicapped children." Id. But cf.
Hyatt, Litigating The Rights Of Handicapped Children To An Appropriate Education: Procedures And Remedies, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1, 7 (1981) (Congress' use of term "appropriate,"
purposely imprecise, thus enabling states to respond to large spectrum of individual handicaps).
6" 102 S. Ct at 3041 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18) (1976)) (emphasis in original).
7o Special education is defined as: "specially designed instruction, at no cost to parents or
guardians, to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child, including classroom instruction,
instruction in physical education, home instruction, and instruction in hospitals and institutions." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(16) (1976).
7' Related services are defined as:
transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive servic(including speech pathology and audiology, psychological services, physical and
occupational therapy, recreation, and medical and counseling services, except that
such medical services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) as may be
required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special education, and includes the early identification and assessment of handicapping conditions in children.
Id. § 1401(17).
" 102 S. Ct. at 3041.
" Id. at 3042 (citing 20 U.S.C. app. § 1401, at 1094 (1976)). Congress subsequently
incorporated this appendix into the statute. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (Supp. IV 1980).
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children "were 'excluded entirely from the public school system' "; 74
3) approximately four million were receiving an "inappropriate edu76
cation." 75 The Court concluded that the congressional findings,
elaborate procedural requirements of the Act, 77 and definition of free
appropriate public education contained therein, 78 indicated that the
EAHCA on its face revealed Congress' intent to bring previously
excluded handicapped children into the public education system 7 and
to require procedures according individualized planning for their education 80
Next, the Court turned to the legislative history of the EAHCA to
determine whether a particular substantive standard for educating
handicapped children was inferrable therefrom. The House Report,"'
observed the Court, demonstrated Congress' desire to provide handicapped children with a " 'basic floor of opportunity' consistent with
equal protection. '8 2 According to the Court, this goal was satisfied
when handicapped children were given equal access to public education.8 3 The Court stated, however, that "[i]t would do little good for
Congress to spend millions of dollars in providing access to a public
education only to have the handicapped child receive no benefit from
that education." 8 4 Nevertheless, the Court maintained that once given
access to public education, handicapped children were entitled to
receive no more than "some form of specialized education." 8 5 The
Court primarily relied upon a Senate Report8 6 which reproduced

14102
75 Id.

S. Ct. at 3042.

76 See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
77 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415, 1416 (1976).
7, See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
79 102 S. Ct. at 3042; see also id. at 3043 (construing H.R. REP. No. 332, supra note 38, at 2)
(emphasis on exclusion from and misplacement within public school system of handicapped
children "confirms the impression" that Congress' primary goal in passing Act was to give
handicapped children access to public education).
10 102 S. Ct. at 3042.
81 H.R. REP. No. 332, supra note 38.
12 102 S. Ct. at 3047 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 332, supra note 38, at 14).
3 d. Although the Court recognized that this access was to be "meaningful," the Court did
not affirmatively define "meaningful." Rather, it negatively couched the term by stating that
once a handicapped child was given access to a public education program, there was no
guarantee of any particular level of education beyond accessibility. Id. at 3043 (citing S. REP.
No. 168, supra note 64, at 11, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1435).
81 Id. at 3048 n.23.
11 Id. at 3045. The Court determined that this specialized program required a state to design
a handicapped child's IEP so that the child would benefit from specialized education. Id. at 3048
& n.23.
80 S. REP. No. 168, supra note 64, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1425.
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statistics detailing the number of handicapped children unserved by
the states' education systems. 87 The Court decided on the basis of this
report that Congress equated the receipt of some special educational
services, i.e., those "served," with an appropriate education.8 8 Thus,
the Court decided that the purpose of the EAHCA was to make
available to all handicapped children a personalized, publicly funded
educational program,8 9 which would be educationally beneficial to
them. 0
The Rowleys had argued that the aim of the EAHCA was
to achieve equal education opportunity for handicapped children
" 'commensurate with the opportunity provided other children.' "91
Although the Court agreed that one purpose of the EAHCA was to
extend equal protection to handicapped children,9 2 it distinguished
this concept from that of "strict equality of opportunity or services." 9 3
The Court deemed this latter notion to be an "entirely unworkable
standard" since each child's ability to learn is influenced by countless
factors.9 4 Moreover, the Court reasoned that since it had previously
ruled that equal protection does not mean equal per pupil expenditure,95 Congress could not have intended to impose this standard upon
the states in providing appropriate education to handicapped chil-

8 102 S. Ct. at 3045; see also H.R. REP. No. 332, supra note 38, at 11-12.
88 102 S. Ct. at 3045. The Court found further support for its conclusion from two additional
sources: 1) a House Committee letter to the United States Commissioner of Education requesting
identification of children served by special education programs, and 2) comments of Senator
Randolph, a principal sponsor of the EAHCA, estimating the number of handicapped children
receiving special education services. Id. at 3045 & n.20.
89 Id. at 3046.

90 Id. at 3048.
1 d. (quoting Brief for Respondent, supra note 2, at 35, 41).
92 Id. at 3047. The Court determined that Congress had not intended that equal protection
ensure the maximum development of each handicapped child's intellectual potential. Id. at
3047, 3049 & n.26. Assuming arguendo this to be the standard under the EAHCA, the Court
found that Congress could not have successfully imposed such a burden upon the states.
"[L]egislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a
contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally
imposed conditions. The legitimacy of Congress' power to legislate under the spending power thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the
terms of the contract. . . . Accordingly, if Congress intends to impose a condition on
the grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously."
Id. at 3050 n.26 (quoting Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
11 Id. at 3047. The Court concluded that the phrase "free appropriate public education" was
"too complex to be captured by the word 'equal' whether one is speaking of opportunities or
services." Id.
94 Id.
9IId.; see San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); see also Mclnnis v.
Olgive, 394 U.S. 322 (1969), aff'g Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
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dren. 6 The majority concluded that "neither [the EAHCA] nor its
history persuasively demonstrated that Congress thought that equal
9 7
protection required anything more than equal access."1
The Court next considered the power which a reviewing court
possessed under the EAHCA. The Court observed that the EAHCA
grants to an aggrieved party a civil cause of action which may be
brought in " ' any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district
court of the United States without regard to the amount in controversy.' ,,98 The complaint "may concern 'any matter relating to the
identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or
the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child.' ""
Additionally, the EAHCA directs "a court '[to] receive the record of
the [state] administrative proceeding, [to] hear additional evidence at
the request of a party, 00 and, basing its decision on the preponderance
of the evidence, [to] grant such relief as the court determines is
appropriate.' ,,10 Relying on this language, the School Board argued
that courts were confined to review state programs for procedural
compliance and had no authority to review these programs for substantive content. 10 2 Conversely, the Rowleys maintained that the
EAHCA "requir[ed] a court to exercise de novo review." 103 The Court
adopted neither petitioners' nor respondents' position in full; rather, it
held that a court's proper scope of review under the EAHCA was
twofold. 1) Had the state complied with the procedures set forth
under the EAHCA, and 2) was the developed IEP reasonably calcu-

"

See 102 S. Ct. at 3047.
Id. The Court stated:
"If sufficient funds are not available to finance all of the services and programs that
are needed and desirable in the system then the available funds must be expended
equitably in such a manner that no child is entirely excluded from a publicly
supported education consistent with his needs and ability to benefit therefrom."
Id. (quoting Mills v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 876 (D.D.C. 1972)).
Id. at 3050 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1976)).
Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(E) (1976)).
'00Judge Broderick of the district court allowed the Rowleys to submit additional evidence
supporting the merits of the total communication technique. See Rowley v. Hendrick Hudson
Cent. Bd. of Educ. II, 483 F. Supp. 536, 538-39 (S.D.N.Y.), afj'd per curiam, 632 F.2d 945 (2d
Cir. 1980), rev'd and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982).
"1 102 S. Ct. at 3050 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1976)).
17

102

Id.

101Id. A de novo trial is defined as:
[t]rying anew the matter involved in an administrative determination the same as if
it had not been heard before and as if no decision had been previously rendered, the
hearing being upon the record made before the administrative agency and such
further evidence as either party may see fit to produce.
BALLANTINES LAW DICTIONARY 1299 (3d ed. 1969).
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lated to benefit the child educationally. 0 4 In rejecting the School
Board's argument that courts could only review programs for procedural compliance, the Court observed that the original wording of the
Act rendered the state administrative proceedings "conclusive if supported by substantial evidence." 105 Congress, however, rejected this
language, and provided that courts were required "to make 'independent decisions based on a preponderance of the evidence.' "106 The
Court determined that this language empowered courts to review and
weigh the evidence presented from the state administrative proceedings. 10 7 The Court reasoned, however, that Congress' emphasis upon
procedure throughout the EAHCA and particularly its placement of
the review provision within a section of the EAHCA entitled "Procedural Safeguards" constituted an implied limitation upon a court's
authority to review substantively the educational policy of the
states. 108 The Court stated that although permitted to weigh the evidence and to review programs for procedural compliance, courts did
not possess freedom to substitute their own educational philosophies
for those set forth by the state. 10 Further, in the court's view, the
express directive in the EAHCA requiring the states to gather information relevant to educating the handicapped and distribute it to educators, illustrated Congress' intent to allow the states to control the
selection of educational methodology.110

104102 S. Ct. at 3051.
10 Id. at 3050. This standard requires a court to uphold the findings of the administrative
body unless those findings are arbitrary or clearly erroneous. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,
351 U.S. 105, 112-13 (1956); see Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 97-104 (1981).
106 102 S.Ct. at 3050 (quoting S. CONE. REP. No. 455, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 50, reprinted in
1975 U.S. CODE CONC. & AD. NEws, 1480, 1503). The preponderance of the evidence standard
relates to the weight, value, and credibility of the proofs and is the traditional standard used in
civil and administrative proceedings. Steadman v.SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 100 n.20 (1981).
"IoSee 102 S. Ct. at 3050-51. The Court recognized "that § 1415(e) require[d] that the
reviewing court 'receive the records of the [state] administrative proceedings" which implied
that a court give due weight to these proceedings. Id. at 3051 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)
(1976)). The Court failed to put forth an exact standard to measure due weight, therefore, the
due weight standard is subject to judicial discretion.
101Id. at 3050-51. The Court viewed Congress' emphasis upon the parties' full participation in
the IEP development and state plan submittal requirements as evidence that state procedural
compliance "would in most cases assure much if not all of what Congress wished in the way of
substantive content in an IEP." Id. at 3050.
I" Id. at 3052; see San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42 (1973) (courts lack
specialized knowledge and expertise necessary to resolve difficult questions of educational policy).
110 102 S. Ct. at 3051 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(3) (1976)). The Court also determined that
allowing states to select the education theory and methodology for a handicapped child would
not leave a child without protection under the EAHCA. Id. at 3052. Parental involvement
during the entire IEP development process and the EAHCA's requirement that recipient states
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Justice Blackmun, concurring in the Court's result, disagreed
with the majority's approach in determining whether a state was
complying with the appropriate education mandate."' He concluded
that Congress had "intended to 'take a more active role under its
responsibility for equal protection of the laws to guarantee that handicapped children [were] provided equal education opportunity.' "112
He maintained that the proper inquiry was whether the IEP "viewed
as a whole, offered. . . an opportunity to understand and participate
in the classroom that was substantially equal to that given . . .nonhandicapped classmates." 1 13 Justice Blackmun opined that his "total
program" approach more accurately effectuated congressional intent
to guarantee equal education opportunity to handicapped children. "14
He maintained that a handicapped student's "total package of services" should be evaluated in terms of whether the student's opportunity to participate and understand was substantially equal to that of
nonhandicapped students. 15
Justice White, writing for the dissent, agreed with the majority's
finding that the EAHCA contained no substantive prescriptions respecting the level of education which the states were to provide handicapped children."" Nevertheless, he disputed the majority's interpretation of the legislative history and concluded that "the Act intend[ed]
to give handicapped children an educational opportunity commensurate with that given other [nonhandicapped] children."1 ' 7 The dissent
also accepted the majority's statutory definition of free appropriate
education, but emphasized that the purpose of "special education,"
was to provide " 'specially designed instruction . . . to meet the
unique needs of a handicapped child.' "I" Justice White maintained

form an advisory committee, in the Court's view, were adequate assurances that a child would
receive all services to which he was entitled. Id.
"I Id. at 3053 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
u2 Id. (quoting S. RE'. No. 168, supra note 64, at 9, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWs at 1433) (emphasis in original).
113Id. (emphasis in original).
114 Id. Justice Blackmun criticized the majority's "reasonably calculated to benefit" standard
because this standard concentrated upon a student's particular achievements. Id.
115Id. He offered two suggestions for the reviewing court. First, greater deference should be
given to the findings of the impartial hearing officer and the State's Commissioner of Education.
Id. But see Monahan v. Nebraska I, 645 F.2d 592 (8th Cir. 1981) (review by State Commissioner
of Education may constitute conflict with federal statute). Second, the reviewing court should
evaluate the entire package of services offered to the student rather than focus on the provision of
one particular service. 102 S. Ct. at 3053 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
16 102 S. Ct. at 3054 (White, J.,dissenting).
17 Id. at 3054-55 (White, J., dissenting).
l8 Id. at 3055 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1401(16) (1976)).
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that the majority had focused on the part of the definition providing
that an appropriate education consisted of the provision of related
services necessary "to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special education."' '9
Accordingly, Justice White posited that the EAHCA was "intended to eliminate the effects of the handicap, at least to the extent
that the child [would] be given an equal opportunity to learn if that is
reasonably possible."120 In his view, the majority had constructed a
standard which allowed for a deaf student (Amy Rowley) to be adjudicated as receiving an appropriate education although she was comprehending less than half of the classroom discussion.121 Justice White
concluded that "'[tihis [was] hardly an equal opportunity to learn,
22
even if Amy [made] passing grades."1
In analyzing the scope of judicial review, Justice White found
unpersuasive the majority's emphasis upon the placement of the judicial review provision within the procedural safeguard section of the
EAHCA. 23 He found this placement quite logical and without particular significance. 24 Further, Justice White stated that the legislative
history indicated judicial review was not limited to procedural matters. 25 He specifically relied upon the substitution of language made
in Conference Committee 2 to support his conclusion that Congress
intended the courts to consider de novo any issues involved in litigation under the EAHCA.1 27 Thus, the Court could conduct "a full and
searching inquiry into any aspect of a handicapped child's education.' 28 It was his opinion that under the majority's standard a
complainant would be precluded from challenging portions of the
IEP, presumably because the content of the IEP would be considered
substantive.129 Continuing, Justice White argued that the mere delegation of responsibility of IEP development to the state-giving the

119 Id.
121

Id.

122 Id.

Justice White was especially critical of the way in which the majority had -purport-

edly" clarified its definition of "appropriate" by determining that congressional intent was to
make public school access "meaningful" to the handicapped child. Id. He found meaningful no
more enlightening than appropriate. Id.
23 Id. at 3056 (White, J., dissenting).
124

125

Id.
Id.

See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
"1 102 S. Ct. at 3056 (White, J., dissenting).
218
Id. at 3057 (White, J., dissenting).
126

129

Id.
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state control over substantive decisions-did not limit a court's scope
of review even if the IEP was reasonably calculated to confer educational benefits.' 30 This standard, he maintained, would defeat the
3
intent of both Congress and the EAHCA.' 1
There is no question that the EAHCA embodied a multiplicity of
concerns.' 32 It is agreed, however, that the legislation evidences a
general desire to facilitate the achievement by handicapped individuals of a more active and productive status in their daily lives.' 33 In
the struggle for legal recognition and protection, advocates for the
handicapped have founded their positions on various theories. The
right to due process and equal protection,134 the right to achieve selfsufficiency,' 35 the right to an equal opportunity, 36 and the right to
achieve maximum intellectual potential 37 are representative of some
of the more prevalent theories. Since the enactment of the EAHCA,
the concentration of litigation has shifted from the constitutionally
based theories of due process and equal protection to the latter theories. 138
First and foremost, Rowley forecloses litigation based on the
theory that the EAHCA mandates that handicapped children achieve
their maximum intellectual potential.' 39 Second, by concluding that
the level of complexity embodied in the concept of equal opportunity
rendered this standard unavailing,' 40 the Court eliminated the feasi-

Id.
"I' See id. at 3056-57 (White, J., dissenting).
132 E.g., Mills v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972) (state
must provide all handicapped children with public education consistent with child's needs and
ability to benefit therefrom); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F.
Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), modified, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (state must provide
access to public education and training appropriate to handicapped child's learning capacities);
S. REP. No. 168, supra note 64, at 9, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS at 1433
(educating handicapped to productive level cost beneficial to society); 121 CONG. REC. 19,492
(1975) (remarks of Sen. Williams) (educating handicapped will ensure that handicapped children become productive members of society); id. at 19,494 (remarks of Sen. Javitz) (legislation
intended to ensure that handicapped children not denied opportunity of adequate education).
133 See Haggerty & Sacks, supra note 58, at 963.
134 Handel, The Role Of The Advocate In Securing The Handicapped Child's Right To An
Effective Minimum Education, 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 349, 358-67 (1975).
"I Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 968 (1981); see
Comment, Self-Sufficiency Under The Education For All Handicapped Children Act: A Suggested Judicial Approach, 1981 DuKE L.J. 516, 520-26.
138 Brief for Respondent, supra note 2, at 21-54. One commentator has cautioned against
confusing the standard of equal education opportunity with identical education opportunity
because of variables affecting educational performance. See Handel, supra note 134, at 354-56.
137 Loughran v. Flanders, 470 F. Supp. 110 (D. Conn. 1979).
138 Hyatt, supra note 68, at 1-2.
,3 See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
140 See id.
130
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bility of that theory as well. Third, by observing the vast differences
between handicapping conditions, the Court found the self-sufficiency standard inadequate as a criterion for measuring the requirements of the EAHCA.14 1 Thus, the Court's decision in Rowley has
narrowed a litigant's choice of theories upon which to proceed to
either due process or equal protection.
The Court has not accepted the right to education as fundamental, beyond at least a heretofore undefined level of minimum adequacy. 142 Thus, for the EAHCA to withstand an equal protection
challenge, the classification established by the legislative scheme need
143 Most
only rationally relate to a constitutionally legitimate end.
certainly, in light of the difficulties in structuring education programs
for the handicapped, the goal of providing a public education could
not be accomplished without such classification. Accordingly, the
EAHCA, as the legislation implementing public education for the
handicapped, bears a rational relation to a legitimate purpose. Ultimately, therefore, there is no choice under Rowley. A claim involving
due process rights is the only viable means of proceeding under the
EAHCA.
By concentrating on the procedural aspects of the EAHCA, the
Rowley Court has extinguished the use of a court's substantive discretion in formulating the content of an IEP. In so doing, the Court has
left intact an area traditionally regulated by the states, 144 while adhering to previously enunciated principles regarding equal education
opportunity.145 Coterminous with the traditional state regulation of
education is expenditure of state and local education funds. Although
the Court failed to discuss this issue in Rowley, it was implicit in the
Court's refusal to extend the standard of free appropriate education

'4 102 S.Ct. at 3048 n.23. The Court found the attainment of self-sufficiency an inadequate
standard for those children who were able to achieve this status without state aid. Id. Concurrently, for those children whose handicaps were so severe as to preclude them from ever attaining
this status, to require a standard of self-sufficiency would be overly burdensome to the state. Id.
42 See San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1973).
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). See
generally Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Foreward:In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1972);
Tussman & tenBroeck, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REv. 341 (1949).
1"4102 S. Ct. at 3051 n.30; see Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (public education
committed to control of state and local authorities); 121 CONG. REC. 19,498 (1975) (remarks of
Sen. Dole) (states have primary responsibility in elementary and secondary education). See
generally Note, Enforcing The Right To An "Appropriate" Education: The Education For All
Handicapped Children Act Of 1975, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1103, 1109 (1979).
"5 See generally Haggerty & Sacks, supra note 58; Note, The Right Of HandicappedChildren
To An Education: The Phoenix Of Rodriguez, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 519 (1974).
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beyond the formulation of a program "reasonably calculated to benefit" the child.14 Under this standard, a state would not be required to
provide any service beyond the minimum beneficial program. The
state, therefore, could presumably guard against expending funds
above the amount needed to meet this threshold level when developing the IEP. 47 As it stands, Rowley leaves the states to determine the
extent of educational benefit to be afforded beyond the threshold
requirement and to grapple, therefore, with conflicting educational
1 48
philosophies regarding the handicapped.
The Court's emphasis in Rowley on procedural due process affects two additional areas: the proposed regulatory amendments to
the EAHCA1 49 and remedies available under the Act. The proposed
regulatory amendments, according to representatives of the Department of Education, are designed to increase administrative flexibility
and reduce paperwork. 50 These goals would be accomplished by
allowing the states more autonomy in complying with procedures
under the EAHCA.151 The regulatory amendments impact considerably upon the EAHCA's general goal to mainstream handicapped children as well as the Act's specific procedural guarantees of due process.
In particular, the mainstreaming concept is affected by allowing the
education agency to consider whether placement of a handicapped
child in a regular classroom setting will disrupt the provision of services to other children in the class. 52 Although the new guideline states
that the education agency cannot speculate as to the disruption, there
is no further specification beyond the determination that the disrup5 3
tion be "clearly ascertainable."
The mainstreaming goal is affected further by a change in the
definition of "related services." The state is given even more subjectiv' See Comment, supra note 64, at 124-28 (discussing potentially oppressive fiscal burdens
present in educating handicapped).
' See Stacey C. v. Pasadena Indep. School Dist., 547 F. Supp. 61 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (realities
of limited education funding necessitate balancing of competing interests to reach fair and
reasonable accommodation).
"' See Note, supra note 144, at 1108-09 & n.39. See generally Hyatt, supra note 68, at 43
n.209; supra note 19.
"I Proposed Amendments to Assistance to States for Education of Handicapped Children, 47
Fed. Reg. 33,836 (1982) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300) (proposed Aug. 4, 1982). These
proposals were the product of a rule review directive, Exec. Order No. 2291, 46 Fed. Reg.
13,193 (1981). reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONc. & AD. NEws 84, to the Department of
Education.
15047 Fed. Reg. 33,836 (1982).
151 Id.
152 Id.
at 33,859; see H.R. REP. No. 906, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 4 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
H.R. REP. No. 906].
153 Id.
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ity in this area as the proposals will give the education agency the
authority to set "reasonable limitations" upon those services. 5 4 This
discretion could affect not only the level of services provided in the
55
regular classroom but also placement of a child.
The proposed changes in the procedural aspects of the regulations
demonstrate the degree to which concentration of decisionmaking is
taking place through transfer of authority to state agencies. This
centralization will be accomplished by two mechanisms. First, by
relaxing IEP formulation timelines and parental notification requirements, the proposed regulations permit the states to adopt a selfimposed "reasonable" time. 56 Second, the proposals allow an education agency to impose the same disciplinary sanctions upon
handicapped children as it would impose on nonhandicapped children
in similar disciplinary proceedings.1 5 7 The prerequisite for the imposition of sanctions under the proposals is that the agency determine, by
its own appropriate procedures, that the child's behavior was not
caused by the handicapping condition.15 8 Thus, the proposals significantly extend the subjective discretion of state agencies in procedural
59
areas.

154

Id. at 33,846; see H.R.

REP.

No. 906, supra note 152, at 4.

"I See id.
156 Id. at 33,847. In contrast, the current regulations require strict adherence to a stringent
time frame. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.343(c) (1981).
117 47 Fed. Reg. 33,854 (1982).
The due process standard for disciplinary proceedings is set
forth in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (in suspension of 10 days or less due process requires
at least oral or written notice of charges and, if denied, explanation and opportunity to be
heard). Under the current regulations, several courts have held that expulsion of a handicapped
child, for example, constitutes a change in educational placement under the EAHCA, which
triggers all the due process guarantees of § 1415. Kaelin v. Grubbs, 682 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1982);
S-I v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1030 (1981): Stuart v. Nappi,
443 F. Supp. 1235 (D. Conn. 1978).
158 47 Fed. Reg. 33,854 (1982).
"I The concentration in Rowley on the procedural aspects of the EAHCA elevates the
importance of the determination by the hearing officer. Section 1415(b)(2) protects a complainant from the potential for bias which may result from a hearing officer's employment by the
state. The § 1415(c) review provision, however, merely provides for a self-imposed impartiality
and independence of decision. Moreover, neither section sets forth any requirements concerning
the professional qualifications of the hearing officer. In effect, therefore, the state is left with
substantial control over the review proceeding of an IEP formulated by a local branch of a state
agency. Comment, supra note 64, at 141-42 & n.197; see Hyatt, supra note 68, at 8 & n.34. This
control over the review provision breeds a situation ripe for abuse and has been subject to
challenge in EAHCA litigation. E.g., Monahan v. Nebraska I, 645 F.2d 592 (8th Cir. 1981); see
N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1983, at 29, col. 2 (on remand, Rowley district court to consider challenge
based on alleged bias of hearing officer): see also Colin K. v. Schmidt, 536 F. Supp. 1375, 1385
(D.R.I. 1982) (emphasizing congressional intent to protect handicapped children and parents
through impartiality in review proceedings).
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Although Rowley supports the general proposition of local autonomy in substantive education decisions, the Court's emphasis on the
state's compliance with the EAHCA's procedures is a basis for attacking any alteration of those safeguards and may be a vehicle for striking
those regulations if promulgated. Thus, Rowley is a double edged
sword, precluding judicial expansion of substantive rights beyond a
state's determination, yet preventing the state from diluting judicially
determined procedural guarantees. Moreover, public response to the
proposals is a strong indication of a refusal to accept any extension of
the state's authority beyond Rowley and will militate against adoption
of the proposals. 60
1
When a state is adjudged to have violated the procedural guarantees provided by the Act, the remedy can range from a relatively
simple form of injunctive relief to the more complex damage recovery.
If a state denies a hearing by an independent examiner or fails to
produce evaluation records, on initial impression, it appears that
injunctive relief is an appropriate remedy. There are situations, however, which present problems not adequately covered by this remedy.
First, if a state denies due process, and as a result, a child is not
properly identified, evaluated, or placed, injunctive relief cannot
compensate that child for the loss of time incurred since the learning
process is progressive. Second, and closely interrelated with state denials of. due process, the EAHCA does not expressly address compensating parents who have decided to provide a child with private services
at their personal expense while awaiting judicial determination of
their EAHCA claim. Since Rowley did not address these issues, future
litigation will focus on whether Congress intended a damage remedy
61
to be an appropriate form of relief under the EAHCA.1

160 See N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1982, at A26, col. 4 (proposed regulations encounter immediate,
widespread protests within Congress, from educators, parents and children's interest groups);
N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1982, at Al, col. 5 (proposed regulations subject to severe criticism by
Congress and parents of handicapped children); see also H.R. Res. 558, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1982); H.R. Rn'. No. 906, supra note 152, at 4-5 (proposed regulations inconsistent with
EAHCA; final regulations to be reviewed with particular care).
"I1The complexity of the damage issue reaches beyond the determination of availability under
the EAHCA. Litigants have utilized other statutes as a basis for their cause of action. Courts,
however, have differed with respect to whether the EAHCA provides a litigant with an exclusive
remedy, Compare Anderson v. Thompson, 658 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1981) (exclusivity of remedy
under EAHCA precludes availability of § 1983 damages) with Miener v, Missouri, 673 F.2d 969
(8th Cir.) (although not recoverable under EAHCA, damages available for violating § 504 of
1973 Rehabilitation Act), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 215 (1982) and Tatro v. Texas, 516 F. Supp.
968 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (plaintiff entitled to award of attorney's fees under 20 U.S.C. § 794a(b)
(1976) as failure to provide service under EAHCA violated § 504 of 1973 Rehabilitation Act). See
generally Hyatt, supra note 68.
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In Stemple v. Prince George's County Board of Education,16 2 the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether a damage
recovery in the form of tuition reimbursement existed for private
placement.16 3 In a literal construction of statutory language,16 4 the
court found a duty on the part of parents to retain their child in his
current program during the pendency of the due process proceedings. 165 According to the court, the existence of this duty precluded
parents from recovering tuition costs for unilaterally placing their
child in a private education program.16
In Anderson v. Thompson,16 7 although recognizing that damages
are not generally available under the EAHCA, the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit declined to accept the analytical framework of
Stemple.' In the view of the Seventh Circuit court, the statutory
language had not created a duty but rather, represented a congressional preference that parents refrain from moving their child during the
proceedings. 6 9 Furthermore, the court determined that the damage
70
issue was to be resolved in light of another section of the statute.
Specifically, the question for decision was whether damages were
appropriate relief under section 1415(e)(2).17'7 Emphasizing the detailed procedural mechanisms of the EAHCA, the court concluded
that the general congressional intent was to provide injunctive relief
rather than to create an action for educational malpractice.7 2 Fur62 623 F.2d 893 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 215 (1982).
...Id. at 894; cf. Amherst-Pelham Regional School Comm. v. Department of Educ., 376
Mass. 480, - 381 N.E.2d 922, 930-31 (1978) (state law entitlement to tuition reimbursement
when parents rejected committee's proposed placement and continued initial private placement
and ultimately prevailed on appropriateness of initial placement).
164 20 U.S.C. § 1416(e)(3) (1976) provides:
During the pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to this section,
unless the State or local educational agency and the parents or guardian otherwise
agree, the child shall remain in the then current educational placement of such
child, or, if applying for initial admission to a public school, shall, with the consent
of the parents or guardian, be placed in the public school program until all such
proceedings have been completed.
Id.
165 623 F.2d at 897.
166 Id. at 897-98. But cf. Hessler v. Maryland State Bd. of Educ., No. 81-2185 (4th Cir. Feb.

10, 1983) (available March 23, 1983 on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (statute "appears to
draw a distinction between continuance in a current educational placement and an initial
admission" in treatment of damages issue).
167 658 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1981).
166 Id. at 1209.
169 Id.
170

Id.

Id.
112 Id. at 1211; accord William S. v. Gill, 536 F. Supp. 505, 512 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Loughran v.
Flanders, 470 F. Supp. 110, 114-15 (D. Conn. 1979); see Gregg B. v. Lawrence School Dist. Bd.
of Educ., 535 F. Supp. 1333, 1339 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
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ther, the court deemed it unlikely that Congress had intended anything other than prospective relief given the legislature's cognizance of
budgetary constraints on the states. 7 3 It was the court's opinion that
potential liability of this nature would result in a hesitancy upon the
part of state educators to be creative in formulating education programs. 174 The court, however, recognized two exceptional circum75
stances in which a limited damage recovery might be justifiable.
Compensation would be recoverable when parents procured special
services which a school refused to provide when the absence of such
services presented the possibility of a serious risk of injury to the child's
physical health. 76 Damages would also be available upon a showing
of an egregious, bad faith failure to comply with the procedural
guarantees of section 1415.177 In either situation, a successful plaintiff
is entitled to a money judgment equaling the cost of the substituted
services. 178
Considering the Rowley Court's emphasis on the procedural aspects of the EAHCA and the Court's refusal to allow the judiciary to
formulate the substantive content of the IEP, it seems unlikely that

658 F.2d at 1212.
Id. at 1213.
175 Id.; accord Ruth Anne M. v. Alvin Indep. School Dist., 532 F. Supp. 460, 468 (S.D. Tex.
1982); Akers v. Bolton, 531 F. Supp. 300, 317 (D. Kan. 1981).
176 658 F.2d at 1213-14; see e.g., Tatro v. Texas, 516 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
177 658 F.2d at 1214; see, e.g., Jose P. Ambach, No. 79 Civ. 270 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 1983)
(available Mar. 23, 1983 on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (authorizing unilateral placement
at public expense for parents waiting more than 60 days for placement); cJ. Foster v. District of
Columbia Bd. of Educ., 523 F. Supp. 1142, 1146 (D.D.C. 1981) (although no absolute bar to
retroactive tuition payments exists, tuition reimbursement denied for unilateral placement when
parents not diligent in pursuit of due process rights).
"178
658 F.2d at 1214; accord Blomstrom v. Massachusetts Dep't of Educ., 532 F. Supp. 707,
711-13 (D. Mass. 1982). Implicit in a claim for damages involving the state is the issue of
sovereign immunity under the eleventh amendment. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
(1974). In Ezratty v. Puerto Rico, 648 F.2d 770 (1st Cir. 1980), the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit observed that absent a finding of implied consent to suit on the part of the state, the
eleventh amendment barred recovery of an award from the state treasury. Id. at 776. The court
noted that the EAHCA's lack of specific reference to monetary suits, its enforcement provision of
withholding funds, and its vast scope weighed against a conclusion of implied consent to state
liability. Id. In Miener v. Missouri, 673 F.2d 969 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 215 (1982),
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stated that Congress had not expressly abrogated the
states' immunity to suit by passing the EAHCA. Id. at 981; see supra note 92. But see Parks v.
Pavkovic, 536 F. Supp. 296 (N.D. I11.1982) (EAHCA's enactment pursuant to § 5 of fourteenth
amendment abrogates eleventh amendment immunity). The court did not apply the immunity
limitation to an award of damages against the officials in their individual capacities. 673 F.2d at
982 n.11; see M.R. v. Milwaukee Public Schools, 495 F. Supp. 864, 867 (E.D. Wisc. 1980); see
also Monell v. New York Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
171
171
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the Court would permit a general damage recovery under the
EAHCA. It is important to note, however, that the Court did remand
on the question of whether due process had been violated in the
hearing procedures. The Court did not offer analytical guidelines or
impose any limitations upon the district court in evaluating the merits
of the claim. This lack of guidance suggests that if a court were to find
a due process violation, the standard for awarding relief would be
based on the principles set forth in Carey v. Piphus.17 In Piphus, the
Court determined that there is no presumption of injury for deprivation of due process rights. 18 0 Rather, to be entitled to damages, a
plaintiff must prove injury resulting from the deprivation.' 8 ' Accordingly, the availability of compensatory relief should be based upon
proof of the injury suffered.
In the special education context, prevailing in the lawsuit should
be sufficient proof that both a deprivation and an injury has indeed
occurred. The value of the services or program could be measured
with specificity by using a market valuation approach. The recovery
of the cost of services or placement should be forthcoming regardless
of whether parents were able to obtain substitute services during the
pendency of their claim. Reflecting upon the goal of the EAHCA to
provide all handicapped children with an appropriate education, albeit largely through procedural mechanisms, it would seem to emasculate the Act to leave the intended beneficiaries of the legislation
without a remedy when injunctive relief cannot compensate the child
merely because the EAHCA does not expressly discuss monetary relief.1 8 2 The power of a court to award appropriate relief cannot be
construed as limited to the issuance of injunctions. Nor, should the
monetary award be limited to compensatory damages. In cases involving egregious bad faith violations of the EAHCA, punitive damages are warranted. If the "all appropriate relief" language is narrowed to encompass only injunctive or compensatory relief, the
resulting loopholes merely encourage pre-EAHCA conditions in the

435 U.S. 247 (1978).
at 264.
Id. Absent proof of actual injury, the Court found the plaintiff would be entitled to
I8'
nominal damages. Id. at 266-67; see Jaworski v. Rhode Island Bd. of Regents, 530 F. Supp. 60
(D.R.I. 1981).
182 See C. Carter v. Sequoyah County Indep. School Dist., 550 F. Supp. 172, 174 (W.D.
Okla. 1981) (due to passage of time, injunctive relief no longer appropriate); Boxall v. Sequoia
Union High School Dist., 464 F. Supp. 1104, 1112 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (legislative history strongly
suggests award of compensatory damages when appropriate).
ISO
Id.
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education of the handicapped. If the EAHCA is to be given full
import, there can be no such restraints on the provision of remedies.
In Rowley, the Supreme Court construed the EAHCA as a procedural statute requiring states funded under the Act to provide due
process rights to handicapped children. The Court imposed upon the
states an affirmative duty to educate handicapped children by developing individually oriented programs which are calculated to benefit
the child. The scope of judicial review under the Act was limited to
consideration of claims involving the aforementioned requirements.
In limiting the scope of review, the Court has given the states additional autonomy in educating handicapped children while concurrently emphasizing strict adherence to the procedural safeguards of
the Act.
The EAHCA neither expressly creates nor denies a damage recovery for violations of the Act. If the standards of the' Act or the
education profession are not met, there is a need for compensation,
and in especially egregious situations, a need for punitive damages.
Currently, protection of handicapped children lies with the professional integrity and motivation of educators, beginning with the classroom teacher and including those responsible for developing the individual program, and ultimately, the reviewing officer. The
dependence upon professional integrity is endemic to our education
system. Unless the approach to education undergoes major structural
changes, this dependency will enhance the need for regular parental
involvement in educational programs for the handicapped. Without a
damage remedy, parents will be unable to protect the rights of their
handicapped children. Rowley merely brings forward the problems of
the EAHCA. Clarification through subsequent Supreme Court interpretations of the EAHCA is needed to reduce the already devastating
impact a child's handicap may have in securing an education for that
child.
Honora Keane Hunter

